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Tibet, the 'great game' and
the CIA
Richard M Bennett
Asia
Times
Thursday, March 27, 2008
Given the historical context of the unrest in Tibet, there is
reason to believe Beijing was caught on the hop with the recent
demonstrations for the simple reason that their planning took
place outside of Tibet and that the direction of the protesters
is similarly in the hands of anti-Chinese organizers safely out
of reach in Nepal and northern India.
Similarly, the funding and overall control of the unrest has
also been linked to Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama, and
by inference to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) because
of his close cooperation with US intelligence for over 50 years.
Indeed, with the CIA's deep involvement with the Free Tibet Movement
and its funding of the suspiciously well-informed Radio Free Asia,
it would seem somewhat unlikely that any revolt could have been
planned or occurred without the prior knowledge, and even perhaps
the agreement, of the National Clandestine Service (formerly known
as the Directorate of Operations) at CIA headquarters in Langley.
(Article continues below)
Respected columnist and former senior Indian Intelligence officer,
B Raman, commented on March 21 that "on the basis of available
evidence, it was possible to assess with a reasonable measure
of conviction" that the initial uprising in Lhasa on March
14 "had been pre-planned and well orchestrated".
Could there be a factual basis to the suggestion that the main
beneficiaries to the death and destruction sweeping Tibet are
in Washington? History would suggest that this is a distinct possibility.
The CIA conducted a large scale covert action campaign against
the communist Chinese in Tibet starting in 1956. This led to a
disastrous bloody uprising in 1959, leaving tens of thousands
of Tibetans dead, while the Dalai Lama and about 100,000 followers
were forced to flee across the treacherous Himalayan passes to
India and Nepal.
The CIA established a secret military training camp for the Dalai
Lama's resistance fighters at Camp Hale near Leadville, Colorado,
in the US. The Tibetan guerrillas were trained and equipped by
the CIA for guerrilla warfare and sabotage operations against
the communist Chinese.
The US-trained guerrillas regularly carried out raids into Tibet,
on occasions led by CIA-contract mercenaries and supported by
CIA planes. The initial training program ended in December 1961,
though the camp in Colorado appears to have remained open until
at least 1966.
The CIA Tibetan Task Force created by Roger E McCarthy, alongside
the Tibetan guerrilla army, continued the operation codenamed
"ST CIRCUS" to harass the Chinese occupation forces
for another 15 years until 1974, when officially sanctioned involvement
ceased.
McCarthy, who also served as head of the Tibet Task Force at
the height of its activities from 1959 until 1961, later went
on to run similar operations in Vietnam and Laos.
By the mid-1960s, the CIA had switched its strategy from parachuting
guerrilla fighters and intelligence agents into Tibet to establishing
the Chusi Gangdruk, a guerrilla army of some 2,000 ethnic Khamba
fighters at bases such as Mustang in Nepal.
This base was only closed down in 1974 by the Nepalese government
after being put under tremendous pressure by Beijing.
After the Indo-China War of 1962, the CIA developed a close relationship
with the Indian intelligence services in both training and supplying
agents in Tibet.
Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison in their book The CIA's Secret
War in Tibet disclose that the CIA and the Indian intelligence
services cooperated in the training and equipping of Tibetan agents
and special forces troops and in forming joint aerial and intelligence
units such as the Aviation Research Center and Special Center.
This collaboration continued well into the 1970s and some of
the programs that it sponsored, especially the special forces
unit of Tibetan refugees which would become an important part
of the Indian Special Frontier Force, continue into the present.
Only the deterioration in relations with India which coincided
with improvements in those with Beijing brought most of the joint
CIA-Indian operations to an end.
Though Washington had been scaling back support for the Tibetan
guerrillas since 1968, it is thought that the end of official
US backing for the resistance only came during meetings between
president Richard Nixon and the Chinese communist leadership in
Beijing in February 1972.
Victor Marchetti, a former CIA officer has described the outrage
many field agents felt when Washington finally pulled the plug,
adding that a number even "[turned] for solace to the Tibetan
prayers which they had learned during their years with the Dalai
Lama".
The former CIA Tibetan Task Force chief from 1958 to 1965, John
Kenneth Knaus, has been quoted as saying, "This was not some
CIA black-bag operation." He added, "The initiative
was coming from ... the entire US government."
In his book Orphans of the Cold War, Knaus writes of the obligation
Americans feel toward the cause of Tibetan independence from China.
Significantly, he adds that its realization "would validate
the more worthy motives of we who tried to help them achieve this
goal over 40 years ago. It would also alleviate the guilt some
of us feel over our participation in these efforts, which cost
others their lives, but which were the prime adventure of our
own."
Despite the lack of official support it is still widely rumored
that the CIA were involved, if only by proxy, in another failed
revolt in October 1987, the unrest that followed and the consequent
Chinese repression continuing till May 1993.
The timing for another serious attempt to destabilize Chinese
rule in Tibet would appear to be right for the CIA and Langley
will undoubtedly keep all its options open.
China is faced with significant problems, with the Uighur Muslims
in Xinjiang province; the activities of the Falun Gong among many
other dissident groups and of course growing concern over the
security of the Summer Olympic Games in August.
China is viewed by Washington as a major threat, both economic
and military, not just in Asia, but in Africa and Latin America
as well.
The CIA also views China as being "unhelpful" in the
"war on terror", with little or no cooperation being
offered and nothing positive being done to stop the flow of arms
and men from Muslim areas of western China to support Islamic
extremist movements in Afghanistan and Central Asian states.
To many in Washington, this may seem the ideal opportunity to
knock the Beijing government off balance as Tibet is still seen
as China's potential weak spot.
The CIA will undoubtedly ensure that its fingerprints are not
discovered all over this growing revolt. Cut-outs and proxies
will be used among the Tibetan exiles in Nepal and India's northern
border areas.
Indeed, the CIA can expect a significant level of support from
a number of security organizations in both India and Nepal and
will have no trouble in providing the resistance movement with
advice, money and above all, publicity.
However, not until the unrest shows any genuine signs of becoming
an open revolt by the great mass of ethnic Tibetans against the
Han Chinese and Hui Muslims will any weapons be allowed to appear.
Large quantities of former Eastern bloc small arms and explosives
have been reportedly smuggled into Tibet over the past 30 years,
but these are likely to remain safely hidden until the right opportunity
presents itself.
The weapons have been acquired on the world markets or from stocks
captured by US or Israeli forces. They have been sanitized and
are deniable, untraceable back to the CIA.
Weapons of this nature also have the advantage of being interchangeable
with those used by the Chinese armed forces and of course use
the same ammunition, easing the problem of resupply during any
future conflict.
Though official support for the Tibetan resistance ended 30 years
ago, the CIA has kept open its lines of communications and still
funds much of the Tibetan Freedom movement.
So is the CIA once again playing the "great game" in
Tibet?
It certainly has the capability, with a significant intelligence
and paramilitary presence in the region. Major bases exist in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and several Central Asian states.
It cannot be doubted that it has an interest in undermining China,
as well as the more obvious target of Iran.
So the probable answer is yes, and indeed it would be rather
surprising if the CIA was not taking more than just a passing
interest in Tibet. That is after all what it is paid to do.
Since September 11, 2001, there has been a sea-change in US Intelligence
attitudes, requirements and capabilities. Old operational plans
have been dusted off and updated. Previous assets re-activated.
Tibet and the perceived weakness of China's position there will
probably have been fully reassessed.
For Washington and the CIA, this may seem a heaven-sent opportunity
to create a significant lever against Beijing, with little risk
to American interests; simply a win-win situation.
The Chinese government would be on the receiving end of worldwide
condemnation for its continuing repression and violation of human
rights and it will be young Tibetans dying on the streets of Lhasa
rather than yet more uniformed American kids.
The consequences of any open revolt against Beijing, however,
are that once again the fear of arrest, torture and even execution
will pervade every corner of both Tibet and those neighboring
provinces where large Tibetan populations exist, such as Gansu,
Qinghai and Sichuan.
And the Tibetan Freedom movement still has little likelihood
of achieving any significant improvement in central Chinese policy
in the long run and no chance whatever of removing its control
of Lhasa and their homeland.
Once again it would appear that the Tibetan people will find
themselves trapped between an oppressive Beijing and a manipulative
Washington.
Beijing sends in the heavies The fear that the United States,
Britain and other Western states may try to portray Tibet as another
Kosovo may be part of the reason why the Chinese authorities reacted
as if faced with a genuine mass revolt rather than their official
portrayal of a short-lived outbreak of unrest by malcontents supporting
the Dalai Lama.
Indeed, so seriously did Beijing view the situation that a special
security coordination unit, the 110 Command Center, has been established
in Lhasa with the primary objective of suppressing the disturbances
and restoring full central government control.
The center appears to be under the direct control of Zhang Qingli,
first secretary of the Tibet Party and a President Hu Jintao loyalist.
Zhang is also the former Xinjiang deputy party secretary with
considerable experience in counter-terrorism operations in that
region.
Others holding important positions in Lhasa are Zhang Xinfeng,
vice minister of the Central Public Security Ministry and Zhen
Yi, deputy commander of the People's Armed Police Headquarters
in Beijing.
The seriousness with which Beijing is treating the present unrest
is further illustrated by the deployment of a large number of
important army units from the Chengdu Military Region, including
brigades from the 149th Mechanized Infantry Division, which acts
as the region's rapid reaction force.
According to a United Press International report, elite ground
force units of the People's Liberation Army were involved in Lhasa,
and the new T-90 armored personnel carrier and T-92 wheeled armored
vehicles were deployed. According to the report, China has denied
the participation of the army in the crackdown, saying it was
carried out by units of the armed police. "Such equipment
as mentioned above has never been deployed by China's armed police,
however."
Air support is provided by the 2nd Army Aviation Regiment, based
at Fenghuangshan, Chengdu, in Sichuan province. It operates a
mix of helicopters and STOL transports from a frontline base near
Lhasa. Combat air support could be quickly made available from
fighter ground attack squadrons based within the Chengdu region.
The Xizang Military District forms the Tibet garrison, which
has two mountain infantry units; the 52nd Brigade based at Linzhi
and the 53rd Brigade at Yaoxian Shannxi. These are supported by
the 8th Motorized Infantry Division and an artillery brigade at
Shawan, Xinjiang.
Tibet is also no longer quite as remote or difficult to resupply
for the Chinese army. The construction of the first railway between
2001 and 2007 has significantly eased the problems of the movement
of large numbers of troops and equipment from Qinghai onto the
rugged Tibetan plateau.
Other precautions against a resumption of the long-term Tibetan
revolts of previous years has led to a considerable degree of
self-sufficiency in logistics and vehicle repair by the Tibetan
garrison and an increasing number of small airfields have been
built to allow rapid-reaction units to gain access to even the
most remote areas.
The Chinese Security Ministry and intelligence services had been
thought to have a suffocating presence in the province and indeed
the ability to detect any serious protest movement and suppress
resistance.
Richard M Bennett is an intelligence and security consultant,
AFI Research.
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